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This book contains 14 contributions demonstrating applications of the firm theory
of the life cycle to the analysis of corporate governance problems. It is an
interesting and innovative approach to a theme dominated by the narrow and static
perspectives of the literature published in the last decade. The debate about the
meaning and political and economic consequences of corporate governance
systems has been influenced by the agency perspective of the firm. We can confirm
this statement with reference to the position of Hart (1995), where he explains that
“corporate governance issues arise in an organisation whenever ...an agency
problem, or conflict of interests involving members of the organization” is present,
or the frequently quoted Shleifer and Vishny (1997) survey, in which they state that
“corporate governance is an agency perspective sometimes referred to as separation
of ownership and control”. The normative conclusion that results from this
framework is the “maximisation of shareholder value” as a means to obtain
superior economic performance not only for a particular corporation but also for
the economy as whole.
The “stakeholder perspective” of corporate governance (usually seen as an
alternative approach to governance problems) deals also with social justice, and as
social cohesion within a nation is a requirement for international competitiveness,
those making such a claim argue that companies which draw on the experience of
all of their stakeholders will be more efficient than those that focus only on the
shareholder interests and experience (see for example Kelly et al. 1997). The
theoretical argument is that physical assets in which shareholders invest are not the
only ones that create value in the corporation. Other stakeholders, such as
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employees (who invest in human capital) or creditors also bear some firm-specific
risk and should be accorded “residual claimant” status alongside with shareholders
(Blair 1995).
The limitations of both arguments can be found in their reliance on neoclassical
theory for understanding economic performance, namely the individual nature of
the resource allocation process and incentive systems. Production and innovation
processes generate returns not only by individual investments in human and
physical resources, but also by integration of these resources in an organizational
learning process (O’Sullivan 2001). The investments that make assets firm specific
imply organizational and collective learning and change over time in response to
evolving opportunities and threats of the competitive environment. In this broad
context, corporate governance is also concerned with all the social institutions that
shape the process of resource allocation in corporate enterprises.
Besides the focus on agency theory, approaches to corporate governance have
focused on large, mature firms, neglecting the economic relevance of young and
small ones that face profit constraints. Small family firms, start-ups or “threshold
firms” need to find the essential resources and knowledge for growth, and this
means the opportunity to face agency problems. Thus corporate governance must
be viewed as a dynamic process, changing with different stages of the firm’s life
cycle, accommodating shifts in ownership structure, differing balances between
external and internal stakeholders, monitoring and control functions and strategic
behavior for assuring growth and survival. To be comprehensive, the analysis of
corporate governance needs to combine the agency’s problems with firm strategy
over the life cycle and with economic and institutional dynamics.
It is good to see a book addressing some of the concerns just mentioned. In the
first chapter, the editors introduce the life cycle approach of corporate governance
and then the book is organized in two main subject areas. The first group of nine
essays studies the relation between Governance and Life-cycle Stages of firm
development. Mayer (Chapter 2) examines Venture Capital as one stage in the
transition from ownership and control by the founders until the stage of dispersed
ownership of quoted firms. Zahara and Hayton (Chapter 3) observe the evolution
of the board composition of 416 US high technology new ventures, detecting
growing outside representation and diversity in educational and functional
backgrounds of directors from the start-up to the adolescent phase. Chapter 4
contains a study of 1,464 US family firms developed by Schulze, Lubatkin and
Dino, relating the use of debt with ownership dispersion among directors. They
find a U-shaped curve relationship resulting from a wedge between the interests of
those family members who run the firm and the interests of the other family
owners, revealing agency problems between the controlling and other minority
shareholders.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the characteristics of external investors by means of
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Filatotchev, Wrick and Arbeck investigate the
evolution of 293 entrepreneurial firms in the UK and find that boards of the Venture
Capital IPOs are more independent than other IPOs, and Venture Capital syndicates
invest in relatively more risky firms. Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed try to
analyze the question whether the presence of Venture Capital backing and the lock-
in agreements of Venture Capitalists act as strategic complements or substitutes to
the lock-in agreements of the directors and other shareholders. Using a sample of
IPOs issued in the UK during 1992–1998, they find that a major part of cases use
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the lock-ins of Venture Capitalists and other shareholders as strategic complements
to maximize the positive valuation effects of third-party certification, signalling
and monitoring. Goergen and Renneboog examine a sample of German and UK
firms and conclude that there is no relationship between the dilution of original
ownership resulting from IPOs and long run performance.
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 examine peculiar problems of corporate governance in
mature firms. Haynes, Thompson and Wright use a sample of 500 quoted firms in
the UK and conclude that manager decisions about downsizing and divestment
must be encouraged by share based mechanisms. Toms and Filatotchev investigate
the financial constraints to retrenchment and turnaround, showing that managers of
large firms often face a trade off between competitive high fixed sunk investments
impossible (or difficult) to sell in the event of a crisis, and no competitive ones,
permitting only normal profit levels. Weir, Laing and Wright try to find the
determinants of a company’s decision to change from publicly quoted to private
control (PTP), confirming that PTPs have higher board shareholdings and higher
institutional shareholdings than other acquisitions. This conclusion is compatible
with the financial incentive hypothesis, which states that the greater the internal
shareholdings, the greater the financial incentive to take a company private and
thus increase personal wealth of managers.
A second group of papers treats the relationship between Industrial and
Institutional Life Cycles. Toms and Wright (Chapter 11) compare the differences
between UK and USA, usually seen as the most representative countries of the
market-based system. The main differences lie in the different roles of economic
institutions in the process of industrialization in the period following the Industrial
Revolution. Conglomerate growth was a consequence of regulatory restrictions
resulting from the concentration of USA large-scale firms threatening account-
ability and efficiency by means of monopoly power and anti-competitive practices.
By contrast, moderate-sized industries and firms forced British capital abroad and
left domestic entrepreneurs dependent upon network and alliance type of
capitalism. Consequently, UK firms performed badly during the 1959–1980
period, importing the American managerial, multi-divisional, large-scale model of
industry, but became well placed from 1980, adapting to the shareholder
capitalism.
Pye and Colville show, in Chapter 12, the confluence of micro- and macro-level
governance issues, analyzing the roles of cultural heritage and board strategy
against age in the definition of corporate maturity and life cycle. The intention of
Gispert, de Jong, Kabir and Rennboog in Chapter 13 is to examine whether
differences in corporate governance systems of Belgium, Netherlands and UK lead
to differences in industrial performance, taking into account the control concen-
tration and board structure characteristics of a matched sample of firms. The main
idea is to confront the market based system of UK, with the Continental European
governance system associated with the French style of Belgium and with the
German style of the Netherlands. They conclude that country-specific corporate
governance features are more important in determining firm performance than the
stylized facts of the different corporate governance systems in the international
context. This means that it is necessary to include country-specific factors as
additional explanatory variables of corporate performance.
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Finally, Jones and Mygind in Chapter 14 investigate the development of specific
patterns of ownership structures and dynamics over the life cycle of the Baltic
companies. They analyze both starting and final ownership configurations for
sample enterprises created by transition processes from central planning to market
economy, trying to understand the dynamic period of adjustment in governance
structures. Important institutional features influencing this process include the
privatization method (which may favor managers, concentrated foreign investors
or diversified external ownership), the weak financial system (limited financing
from banks, absence of stock exchange and venture capital) and embryonic
governance institutions for security property rights. They find that, in spite of
important differences in institutional development and privatization process,
similar governance cycles appear in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, the
ownership structures adjustment is faster in Estonia as a consequence of the fast
institutional change, namely of the financial system.
From my point of view the type of research opened by this book needs
articulation with more empirical comparative institutional analysis of
different corporate governance systems all over the world. The cases
studied by the majority of the revised contributions were applied to the
firms of UK and the USA, two countries usually included in the market-
based system. The life cycle approach needs to be confronted with
institutional diversity to test the general predictions about firm and
corporate governance evolution (so many times influenced by the Anglo-
American institutional characteristics) in various historical and cultural
fields. This is the main challenge to this promising line of investigation.
References
Blair M (1995) Ownership and control. Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty first
century. Brookings Institution, Washington
Hart O (1995) Corporate governance: some theory and implications. Econ J 105:678–689
Kelly G, Kelly D, Gamble A (eds) (1997) Stakeholder capitalism. Houndmills. Basingstoke,
Macmillan
O’Sullivan M (2001) Contests for corporate control. Corporate governance in the United States
and Germany. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) A survey of corporate governance. J Finance 52(2):737–783
340 A. Fortunato
